Post by geestkraker on Jun 6, 2019 19:23:37 GMT
Science is Creation
In this article I will argue why the word Science is in fact another word for Creation itself and why it should be perceived as such.
Before I connected with the BEAM material, I was on a hunt to connect questions of consciousness and the very logic of science, which has often been called epistemology throughout the history of so-called philosophy and philosophy of science. I was sure they were connected somehow. According to mathematical physicist and philosopher Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind as paraphrased from Wikipedia: "human consciousness is non-algorithmic and not capable of being modeled by a conventional Turing machine, which includes a digital computer. Penrose hypothesizes that quantum mechanics plays an essential role in the understanding of human consciousness. The collapse of the quantum wavefunction is seen as playing an important role in brain function." A few years later Roger Penrose joined with anaesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff with whom they created a theory on how the human brain tunes rather than creates consciousness. See www.quantumconsciousness.org.
Similarly I found that the most thorough philosopher of science in so-called 'Western philosophy' Charles S. Peirce emphasised that without humans' desire to learn, science is nothing or rather not science at all. Understanding what the term science means without nailing this down will hamper the process of discovery and thus the spirit of what science ought to be. According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "[Charles S. Peirce] understood philosophy to be the philosophy of science, and he understood logic to be the logic of science (where the word “science” has a sense that is best captured by the German word Wissenschaft)."
Let us compare with terms according to the decent online Wiktionary; I will resort to necessary corrections below:
While both Stanford and Wiktionary are somewhat right, the Anglophone understanding of what is the scientific method does in fact not suffice as being the scientific method which indeed has a sense better captured by the Germanic word Wissenschaft. Even the word science in old English as well as its original language French had or has a sense better captured by the word Wissenschaft, which can imply that culture has had a great influence on how we understand this term for better or worse. In the case of the Anglophone world, the term has been watered down by the philosophy materialism and logical positivism in particular. Ironically it was attempted rescued by the American philosopher Charles Peirce before it came to that and according to his model:
"[Science is] the method wherein inquiry regards itself as fallible and purposely tests itself and criticizes, corrects, and improves itself."
According to this model, the very scientific method has a sense better captured by the Germanic word Wissenschaft, because the word means knowledge-creation and indeed depends on the creative human spirit and is self-corrective and evolutionary like Nature itself. No one has created a model of how a Turing machine can become a scientist, because the technology required is this mini-me of infinite potential of the infinitely powerful and infinitely advanced quantum-computer of Creation that powers reality and everything within it - the reality also called Nature. Peirce's so-called Pragmatic model should indeed have been called an attempt at creating the *creative-evolutionary model* of science, where science is meant as an imitation of Nature itself and the scientist is a decoder of the super-technology Nature. According to Arthur C. Clarke's third law of his Three Laws: "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." Nature and Creation should be understood as this infitely advanced technology that engendered human consciousness and curiosity in the first place and on which it depends and owes its existence.
It is worth noting that it is not even considered controversial to state that there are generally three schools of inquiry, namely:
Epistemological objectivism a.k.a. logical positivism; assumes a clear separation between objective and subjective.
Epistemological subjectivism a.k.a. social-constructivism; assumes all science are simply social constructs.
Epistemological fallibilism, best elaborated by Charles S. Peirce's Pragmatic Model, which maintains that science is evolutionary like nature itself. I call this model the animistic model, logical animism or the creative-evolutionary model.
As outlined from Eugene Halton's Peircean Animism and the End of Civilization:
All too many Earthling so-called scientists do not even know the term fallibilism, however to the more experienced of them it is not completely controversial to state why this one is the only of the three that can survive on its own merits. And yet it escapes them that naturally this is so because it is adaptive like Nature's evolution itself and not understood how close this model is to the actual truth and why it is indispensable without the power-source Creation in the first place. I will argue in favour of a model that is consciously connected to Creation yet continues where Peirce' left off. This model will be known as the Creative-Evolutionary Model as a model for understanding what Science really means, which thus indeed is another word for Creation itself. As with Peirce's model, none are exempt from the creative-evolutionary process of the three modes of inquiry roughly as exemplified by or never inferior to Peirce's Pragmatic Model as quoted from Wikipedia:
As outlined in the above quote Peirce's abductive reasoning depends on what Galileo called il lume naturale (the natural light) - namely Creation itself.
Furthermore I will take advantage of his Classification of the Sciences, where sciences are divided into three 'buildings' from most abstract to most concrete:
The House of Mathematics - The scientific study of hypotheses which it first frames and then traces to their consequences; i.e. draws necessary conclusions from hypothetical objects.
The House of Koinos - Cenoscopic or spiritual sciences - This area does not depend on a written language to be mastered and has indeed been mastered by human individuals for millennia:
- Aesthetics (music + visual arts)
- Ethics (settling questions of right and wrong)
- Logic of Science itself or simply logic
- Spirit-training (the core of House Koinos)
- Meditation
- Martial arts
The House of Idios - Idioscopic or specialised sciences. This house has two main categories, where none are exempt from the creative-evolutionary model if they have any hope to be taken serious as disciplines, because in either case a phenomena is real in the Universe in either a more coarse-matter sense or a more fine-matter sense:
Physical sciences:
- Astronomy
- Physics
- Chemistry
- Geology
- Biology
- Ecology (where proper physical economics ought to belong)
Psychical sciences:
- Anthropology
- Archaeology
- Linguistics
- Psychology
- Sociology
- History
- Journalism
Cenoscopic is the vulgar-latinized conjunction of the Hellenic words κοινος (koinos, common) + σκοπέω (skopéō, “examine, inspect, look to or into, consider”).
Similarly idioscopic is the vulgar-latinized conjunction of the Hellenic words ἴδιος + σκοπέω. As quoted from Wiktionary:
PSI Cortex is here to stave off the dual nonsense that you can either ignore the pilot in the machine (perspective, spirit) or the cause-and-effect-reality (reality). Epistemological subjectivism would claim that claims of cause-and-effect are just social constructs; whereas epistemological objectivism would claim that the mind belongs in the world of subjectivity completely separate from physical objective reality.
The Creative-evolutionary model rejects either duality and insists that although there is relative subjectivity and relative objectivity, in fundamental reality there is no separation. And not only that, the pilot/spirit has a lot more potential power and influence on cause-and-effect-reality. This is where the Creative-evolutionary goes beyond Peirce's Pragmatic Model.
We should emphasize on how indispensable Creation and House Koinos are to the development of everything else.
In this article I will argue why the word Science is in fact another word for Creation itself and why it should be perceived as such.
Before I connected with the BEAM material, I was on a hunt to connect questions of consciousness and the very logic of science, which has often been called epistemology throughout the history of so-called philosophy and philosophy of science. I was sure they were connected somehow. According to mathematical physicist and philosopher Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind as paraphrased from Wikipedia: "human consciousness is non-algorithmic and not capable of being modeled by a conventional Turing machine, which includes a digital computer. Penrose hypothesizes that quantum mechanics plays an essential role in the understanding of human consciousness. The collapse of the quantum wavefunction is seen as playing an important role in brain function." A few years later Roger Penrose joined with anaesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff with whom they created a theory on how the human brain tunes rather than creates consciousness. See www.quantumconsciousness.org.
Similarly I found that the most thorough philosopher of science in so-called 'Western philosophy' Charles S. Peirce emphasised that without humans' desire to learn, science is nothing or rather not science at all. Understanding what the term science means without nailing this down will hamper the process of discovery and thus the spirit of what science ought to be. According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "[Charles S. Peirce] understood philosophy to be the philosophy of science, and he understood logic to be the logic of science (where the word “science” has a sense that is best captured by the German word Wissenschaft)."
Let us compare with terms according to the decent online Wiktionary; I will resort to necessary corrections below:
en.Wiktionary.org:
Epistemology
Etymology
From Ancient Greek ἐπιστήμη (epistḗmē, “science, knowledge”), from ἐπίσταμαι (epístamai, “I know”) + -λογία (-logía, “discourse”), from λέγω (légō, “I speak”). The term was introduced into English by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864).
Noun
epistemology (countable and uncountable, plural epistemologies)
1. (uncountable) The branch of philosophy dealing with the study of knowledge; theory of knowledge, asking such questions as "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", "What do people know?", "How do we know what we know?". quotations ▼
Some thinkers take the view that, beginning with the work of Descartes, epistemology began to replace metaphysics as the most important area of philosophy.
2. (countable) A particular theory of knowledge. quotations ▼
In his epistemology, Plato maintains that our knowledge of universal concepts is a kind of recollection.
Logic
Etymology
From Old French logike, from Latin logica, from Ancient Greek λογική (logikḗ, “logic”), from feminine of λογικός (logikós, “of or pertaining to speech or reason or reasoning, rational, reasonable”), from λόγος (lógos, “speech, reason”).
Wissenschaft
Etymology
From Wissen (“knowledge”) + -schaft (“making”). Akin to Dutch wetenschap, West Frisian wittenskip, Danish videnskab, Norwegian vitenskap and Swedish vetenskap.
Wissenschaft (genitive Wissenschaft, plural Wissenschaften)
1. the state of being acquainted with a circumstance, cognizance quotations ▼
2. science, scholarship (collective discipline of learning acquired through a scientific or scholarly method; totality of knowledge derived from scientific inquiry)
3. an academic discipline; in general, the sciences, humanities taken as a whole
Usage notes
Wissenschaft has a much broader meaning than the English word science. While science refers to systematically acquired, objective knowledge obtained through a particular methodology (such as the scientific method), and includes only natural sciences, social sciences, and formal sciences; Wissenschaft also includes the humanities and philosophy and refers to learning and knowledge in general, whether obtained through scientific or non-scientific means.
• For natural science (including only hard sciences such as astronomy, biology, chemistry, earth science, and physics), see Naturwissenschaft.
• For social science (including the soft sciences such as anthropology, archaeology, economics, linguistics, psychology, and political science), see Geisteswissenschaft.
• For pseudoscience (such as gender studies), see Scheinwissenschaft or Pseudowissenschaft.
Schaffen
Etymology
From Middle High German schaffen, from Old High German scaffan, scafan, scaphan, from Proto-Germanic *skapjaną. Compare Dutch scheppen and English shape.
Verb
schaffen (class 6 strong, third-person singular simple present schafft, past tense schuf, past participle geschaffen, past subjunctive schüfe, auxiliary haben)
1. (transitive) to create; to produce; to make; to cause; to establish
Related terms
• schöpfen
Epistemology
Etymology
From Ancient Greek ἐπιστήμη (epistḗmē, “science, knowledge”), from ἐπίσταμαι (epístamai, “I know”) + -λογία (-logía, “discourse”), from λέγω (légō, “I speak”). The term was introduced into English by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864).
Noun
epistemology (countable and uncountable, plural epistemologies)
1. (uncountable) The branch of philosophy dealing with the study of knowledge; theory of knowledge, asking such questions as "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", "What do people know?", "How do we know what we know?". quotations ▼
Some thinkers take the view that, beginning with the work of Descartes, epistemology began to replace metaphysics as the most important area of philosophy.
2. (countable) A particular theory of knowledge. quotations ▼
In his epistemology, Plato maintains that our knowledge of universal concepts is a kind of recollection.
Logic
Etymology
From Old French logike, from Latin logica, from Ancient Greek λογική (logikḗ, “logic”), from feminine of λογικός (logikós, “of or pertaining to speech or reason or reasoning, rational, reasonable”), from λόγος (lógos, “speech, reason”).
Wissenschaft
Etymology
From Wissen (“knowledge”) + -schaft (“making”). Akin to Dutch wetenschap, West Frisian wittenskip, Danish videnskab, Norwegian vitenskap and Swedish vetenskap.
Wissenschaft (genitive Wissenschaft, plural Wissenschaften)
1. the state of being acquainted with a circumstance, cognizance quotations ▼
2. science, scholarship (collective discipline of learning acquired through a scientific or scholarly method; totality of knowledge derived from scientific inquiry)
3. an academic discipline; in general, the sciences, humanities taken as a whole
Usage notes
Wissenschaft has a much broader meaning than the English word science. While science refers to systematically acquired, objective knowledge obtained through a particular methodology (such as the scientific method), and includes only natural sciences, social sciences, and formal sciences; Wissenschaft also includes the humanities and philosophy and refers to learning and knowledge in general, whether obtained through scientific or non-scientific means.
• For natural science (including only hard sciences such as astronomy, biology, chemistry, earth science, and physics), see Naturwissenschaft.
• For social science (including the soft sciences such as anthropology, archaeology, economics, linguistics, psychology, and political science), see Geisteswissenschaft.
• For pseudoscience (such as gender studies), see Scheinwissenschaft or Pseudowissenschaft.
Schaffen
Etymology
From Middle High German schaffen, from Old High German scaffan, scafan, scaphan, from Proto-Germanic *skapjaną. Compare Dutch scheppen and English shape.
Verb
schaffen (class 6 strong, third-person singular simple present schafft, past tense schuf, past participle geschaffen, past subjunctive schüfe, auxiliary haben)
1. (transitive) to create; to produce; to make; to cause; to establish
Related terms
• schöpfen
While both Stanford and Wiktionary are somewhat right, the Anglophone understanding of what is the scientific method does in fact not suffice as being the scientific method which indeed has a sense better captured by the Germanic word Wissenschaft. Even the word science in old English as well as its original language French had or has a sense better captured by the word Wissenschaft, which can imply that culture has had a great influence on how we understand this term for better or worse. In the case of the Anglophone world, the term has been watered down by the philosophy materialism and logical positivism in particular. Ironically it was attempted rescued by the American philosopher Charles Peirce before it came to that and according to his model:
"[Science is] the method wherein inquiry regards itself as fallible and purposely tests itself and criticizes, corrects, and improves itself."
According to this model, the very scientific method has a sense better captured by the Germanic word Wissenschaft, because the word means knowledge-creation and indeed depends on the creative human spirit and is self-corrective and evolutionary like Nature itself. No one has created a model of how a Turing machine can become a scientist, because the technology required is this mini-me of infinite potential of the infinitely powerful and infinitely advanced quantum-computer of Creation that powers reality and everything within it - the reality also called Nature. Peirce's so-called Pragmatic model should indeed have been called an attempt at creating the *creative-evolutionary model* of science, where science is meant as an imitation of Nature itself and the scientist is a decoder of the super-technology Nature. According to Arthur C. Clarke's third law of his Three Laws: "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." Nature and Creation should be understood as this infitely advanced technology that engendered human consciousness and curiosity in the first place and on which it depends and owes its existence.
It is worth noting that it is not even considered controversial to state that there are generally three schools of inquiry, namely:
Epistemological objectivism a.k.a. logical positivism; assumes a clear separation between objective and subjective.
Epistemological subjectivism a.k.a. social-constructivism; assumes all science are simply social constructs.
Epistemological fallibilism, best elaborated by Charles S. Peirce's Pragmatic Model, which maintains that science is evolutionary like nature itself. I call this model the animistic model, logical animism or the creative-evolutionary model.
As outlined from Eugene Halton's Peircean Animism and the End of Civilization:
Peirce claimed that through abductive inference, new information validly enters into scientific reasoning. Without it, as in [Karl] Popper’s view that hypothesis is not itself logical [or that logic is not logic without abductive reasoning, rsfo], a lucky but not logical guess, science is reduced to a calculating machine or knowledge system operating solely through deductive and inductive inferences [i.e. epistemological objectivism (i.e. (dualistic) logical positivism, materialism), rsfo]; with it, science is a life, rooted in the desire to learn. Knowledge, in Peirce’s view of science, is not the big thing it is for many other theories of science. Rather, it is the desire to learn, rooted in inquiry.
Peirce’s appeals to instinct [human spirit, rsfo] have troubled philosophers, especially those who believe that all human beliefs are social constructions, including human nature [i.e. epistemological subjectivism (also dualistic), rsfo]. Yet I claim that the evolutionary record reveals that human nature results from a fascinating bio-social process of development that required the exercise of one’s instinctive inferencing, which remains embedded in the human body today, though repressed by the rational-mechanical outlook of modern consciousness.
We need to look to the conditions of hunter-gatherer life for the most direct picture of how a human propensity for abductive inferencing evolved, a better view, in my opinion, than that afforded by machine models of human consciousness [Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind comes to mind, rsfo]. I am also claiming that the historical conception of God itself marks the moment of human alienation from participation in the conditions through which human abductive inference evolved [perhaps the real proverbial fall of man, rsfo].
Peirce’s appeals to instinct [human spirit, rsfo] have troubled philosophers, especially those who believe that all human beliefs are social constructions, including human nature [i.e. epistemological subjectivism (also dualistic), rsfo]. Yet I claim that the evolutionary record reveals that human nature results from a fascinating bio-social process of development that required the exercise of one’s instinctive inferencing, which remains embedded in the human body today, though repressed by the rational-mechanical outlook of modern consciousness.
We need to look to the conditions of hunter-gatherer life for the most direct picture of how a human propensity for abductive inferencing evolved, a better view, in my opinion, than that afforded by machine models of human consciousness [Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind comes to mind, rsfo]. I am also claiming that the historical conception of God itself marks the moment of human alienation from participation in the conditions through which human abductive inference evolved [perhaps the real proverbial fall of man, rsfo].
All too many Earthling so-called scientists do not even know the term fallibilism, however to the more experienced of them it is not completely controversial to state why this one is the only of the three that can survive on its own merits. And yet it escapes them that naturally this is so because it is adaptive like Nature's evolution itself and not understood how close this model is to the actual truth and why it is indispensable without the power-source Creation in the first place. I will argue in favour of a model that is consciously connected to Creation yet continues where Peirce' left off. This model will be known as the Creative-Evolutionary Model as a model for understanding what Science really means, which thus indeed is another word for Creation itself. As with Peirce's model, none are exempt from the creative-evolutionary process of the three modes of inquiry roughly as exemplified by or never inferior to Peirce's Pragmatic Model as quoted from Wikipedia:
Paying special attention to the generation of explanations, Peirce outlined the scientific method as a coordination of three kinds of inference in a purposeful cycle aimed at settling doubts, as follows (in §III–IV in "A Neglected Argument"[5] except as otherwise noted):
1 Abduction (or retroduction). Guessing, inference to explanatory hypotheses for selection of those best worth trying. From abduction, Peirce distinguishes induction as inferring, on the basis of tests, the proportion of truth in the hypothesis. Every inquiry, whether into ideas, brute facts, or norms and laws, arises from surprising observations in one or more of those realms (and for example at any stage of an inquiry already underway). All explanatory content of theories comes from abduction, which guesses a new or outside idea so as to account in a simple, economical way for a surprising or complicative phenomenon. Oftenest, even a well-prepared mind guesses wrong. But the modicum of success of our guesses far exceeds that of sheer luck and seems born of attunement to nature by instincts developed or inherent, especially insofar as best guesses are optimally plausible and simple in the sense, said Peirce, of the "facile and natural", as by Galileo's natural light of reason and as distinct from "logical simplicity". Abduction is the most fertile but least secure mode of inference. Its general rationale is inductive: it succeeds often enough and, without it, there is no hope of sufficiently expediting inquiry (often multi-generational) toward new truths.[99] Coordinative method leads from abducing a plausible hypothesis to judging it for its testability[100] and for how its trial would economize inquiry itself.[101] Peirce calls his pragmatism "the logic of abduction".[102] His pragmatic maxim is: "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object".[96] His pragmatism is a method of reducing conceptual confusions fruitfully by equating the meaning of any conception with the conceivable practical implications of its object's conceived effects – a method of experimentational mental reflection hospitable to forming hypotheses and conducive to testing them. It favors efficiency. The hypothesis, being insecure, needs to have practical implications leading at least to mental tests and, in science, lending themselves to scientific tests. A simple but unlikely guess, if uncostly to test for falsity, may belong first in line for testing. A guess is intrinsically worth testing if it has instinctive plausibility or reasoned objective probability, while subjective likelihood, though reasoned, can be misleadingly seductive. Guesses can be chosen for trial strategically, for their caution (for which Peirce gave as example the game of Twenty Questions), breadth, and incomplexity.[103] One can hope to discover only that which time would reveal through a learner's sufficient experience anyway, so the point is to expedite it; the economy of research is what demands the leap, so to speak, of abduction and governs its art.[101]
2 Deduction. Two stages:
3 Induction. The long-run validity of the rule of induction is deducible from the principle (presuppositional to reasoning in general[96]) that the real is only the object of the final opinion to which adequate investigation would lead;[104] anything to which no such process would ever lead would not be real. Induction involving ongoing tests or observations follows a method which, sufficiently persisted in, will diminish its error below any predesignate degree. Three stages:
1 Abduction (or retroduction). Guessing, inference to explanatory hypotheses for selection of those best worth trying. From abduction, Peirce distinguishes induction as inferring, on the basis of tests, the proportion of truth in the hypothesis. Every inquiry, whether into ideas, brute facts, or norms and laws, arises from surprising observations in one or more of those realms (and for example at any stage of an inquiry already underway). All explanatory content of theories comes from abduction, which guesses a new or outside idea so as to account in a simple, economical way for a surprising or complicative phenomenon. Oftenest, even a well-prepared mind guesses wrong. But the modicum of success of our guesses far exceeds that of sheer luck and seems born of attunement to nature by instincts developed or inherent, especially insofar as best guesses are optimally plausible and simple in the sense, said Peirce, of the "facile and natural", as by Galileo's natural light of reason and as distinct from "logical simplicity". Abduction is the most fertile but least secure mode of inference. Its general rationale is inductive: it succeeds often enough and, without it, there is no hope of sufficiently expediting inquiry (often multi-generational) toward new truths.[99] Coordinative method leads from abducing a plausible hypothesis to judging it for its testability[100] and for how its trial would economize inquiry itself.[101] Peirce calls his pragmatism "the logic of abduction".[102] His pragmatic maxim is: "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object".[96] His pragmatism is a method of reducing conceptual confusions fruitfully by equating the meaning of any conception with the conceivable practical implications of its object's conceived effects – a method of experimentational mental reflection hospitable to forming hypotheses and conducive to testing them. It favors efficiency. The hypothesis, being insecure, needs to have practical implications leading at least to mental tests and, in science, lending themselves to scientific tests. A simple but unlikely guess, if uncostly to test for falsity, may belong first in line for testing. A guess is intrinsically worth testing if it has instinctive plausibility or reasoned objective probability, while subjective likelihood, though reasoned, can be misleadingly seductive. Guesses can be chosen for trial strategically, for their caution (for which Peirce gave as example the game of Twenty Questions), breadth, and incomplexity.[103] One can hope to discover only that which time would reveal through a learner's sufficient experience anyway, so the point is to expedite it; the economy of research is what demands the leap, so to speak, of abduction and governs its art.[101]
2 Deduction. Two stages:
- I Explication. Unclearly premissed, but deductive, analysis of the hypothesis in order to render its parts as clear as possible.
- II Demonstration: Deductive Argumentation, Euclidean in procedure. Explicit deduction of hypothesis's consequences as predictions, for induction to test, about evidence to be found. Corollarial or, if needed, theorematic.
3 Induction. The long-run validity of the rule of induction is deducible from the principle (presuppositional to reasoning in general[96]) that the real is only the object of the final opinion to which adequate investigation would lead;[104] anything to which no such process would ever lead would not be real. Induction involving ongoing tests or observations follows a method which, sufficiently persisted in, will diminish its error below any predesignate degree. Three stages:
- I Classification. Unclearly premissed, but inductive, classing of objects of experience under general ideas.
- II Probation: direct inductive argumentation. Crude (the enumeration of instances) or gradual (new estimate of proportion of truth in the hypothesis after each test). Gradual induction is qualitative or quantitative; if qualitative, then dependent on weightings of qualities or characters;[105] if quantitative, then dependent on measurements, or on statistics, or on countings.
- III Sentential Induction. "...which, by inductive reasonings, appraises the different probations singly, then their combinations, then makes self-appraisal of these very appraisals themselves, and passes final judgment on the whole result".
As outlined in the above quote Peirce's abductive reasoning depends on what Galileo called il lume naturale (the natural light) - namely Creation itself.
Furthermore I will take advantage of his Classification of the Sciences, where sciences are divided into three 'buildings' from most abstract to most concrete:
The House of Mathematics - The scientific study of hypotheses which it first frames and then traces to their consequences; i.e. draws necessary conclusions from hypothetical objects.
The House of Koinos - Cenoscopic or spiritual sciences - This area does not depend on a written language to be mastered and has indeed been mastered by human individuals for millennia:
- Aesthetics (music + visual arts)
- Ethics (settling questions of right and wrong)
- Logic of Science itself or simply logic
- Spirit-training (the core of House Koinos)
- Meditation
- Martial arts
The House of Idios - Idioscopic or specialised sciences. This house has two main categories, where none are exempt from the creative-evolutionary model if they have any hope to be taken serious as disciplines, because in either case a phenomena is real in the Universe in either a more coarse-matter sense or a more fine-matter sense:
Physical sciences:
- Astronomy
- Physics
- Chemistry
- Geology
- Biology
- Ecology (where proper physical economics ought to belong)
Psychical sciences:
- Anthropology
- Archaeology
- Linguistics
- Psychology
- Sociology
- History
- Journalism
Cenoscopic is the vulgar-latinized conjunction of the Hellenic words κοινος (koinos, common) + σκοπέω (skopéō, “examine, inspect, look to or into, consider”).
Similarly idioscopic is the vulgar-latinized conjunction of the Hellenic words ἴδιος + σκοπέω. As quoted from Wiktionary:
ῐ̓́δῐος • (ídios) m (feminine ῐ̓δῐ́ᾱ, neuter ῐ̓́δῐον); first/second declension
1 pertaining to self, that is, one's own
2 private (as opposed to public)
3 related to
4 separate, distinct
5 peculiar, specific, appropriate
1 pertaining to self, that is, one's own
2 private (as opposed to public)
3 related to
4 separate, distinct
5 peculiar, specific, appropriate
PSI Cortex is here to stave off the dual nonsense that you can either ignore the pilot in the machine (perspective, spirit) or the cause-and-effect-reality (reality). Epistemological subjectivism would claim that claims of cause-and-effect are just social constructs; whereas epistemological objectivism would claim that the mind belongs in the world of subjectivity completely separate from physical objective reality.
The Creative-evolutionary model rejects either duality and insists that although there is relative subjectivity and relative objectivity, in fundamental reality there is no separation. And not only that, the pilot/spirit has a lot more potential power and influence on cause-and-effect-reality. This is where the Creative-evolutionary goes beyond Peirce's Pragmatic Model.
We should emphasize on how indispensable Creation and House Koinos are to the development of everything else.